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RE´SUME´
La pre´cision par rapport a` la re´partition des risques et aux e´tapes de validation est indis-
pensable pour appliquer la norme ISO 13849 concernant la se´curite´ des syste`mes de controˆle.
Toutefois, les donne´es de taux d’e´checs sont rarement fournies aux concepteurs et e´gale-
ment ge´ne´ralement non-fournies avec composants utilise´s dans les syste`mes de se´curite´. Plus
re´cemment, les entreprises commencent a` mesurer les taux d’e´checs et incluent ces taux
dans leurs fiches techniques. Pendant ce temps, d’autres sources pour les donne´es peuvent
eˆtre utilise´es, et englobent les donne´es inconnues et erreurs provenant de diffe´rences entre
environnements de tests et d’application/inte´gration re´elle. Les me´thodes conventionnelles
utilise´es pour normes utilisant des niveaux spe´cifiques ne sont pas approprie´es dans ce cas.
De plus, la me´thode d’e´valuation des risques utilise´e pour de´finir le niveau de performance
requis («PLr») pour le syste`me de controˆle de se´curite´ utilise l’avis d’experts pour de´finir
les niveaux de risque des composants. L’utilisation d’avis d’experts entraˆıne des proble`mes
relie´s a` la subjectivite´ et les valeurs spe´cifiques ne sont pas approprie´es pour exprimer l’e´va-
luation ade´quate des risques. L’application de la logique floue pour la norme peut re´soudre
ces deux proble`mes. La logique floue est re´pute´e de traiter efficacement les cas comprenant
l’incertitude et la subjectivite´. La logique floue peut ame´liorer la me´thodologie et re´duire les
allocations supple´mentaires en matie`re de conception.
En utilisant la the´orie d’ensembles flous, deux proble`mes majeurs en appliquant les deux
normes de se´curite´, ISO 13849 et IEC 62061, peuvent eˆtre re´solus dans une certaine mesure.
Le premier proble`me lors de l’application de ces normes se relie aux diffe´rentes approches
utilise´es par chaque norme pour de´finir les niveaux de se´curite´ requis et obtenus pour sys-
te`mes de controˆle. ISO 13849 utilise des niveaux de performance («PL») et IEC 62061 utilise
des niveaux d’inte´grite´ de se´curite´ («SIL»). Bien que les niveaux de se´curite´ pour ces deux
parame`tres sont base´s sur la probabilite´ de de´faillance dangereuse par heure, les me´thodolo-
gies utilise´es pour de´finir les niveaux sont diffe´rentes. En attribuant des valeurs linguistiques
base´es sur des ensembles flous et utilise´es pour de´finir des niveaux pour les parame`tres de
risque, ceci par conse´quent peut aider dans la conception d’une me´thode de re´partition dont
les re´sultats sont plus comparables aux deux approches. De cette fac¸on, les niveaux de se´curite´
provenant de la nouvelle me´thode de logique floue peuvent eˆtre utilise´s par les deux normes
de se´curite´ et re´solvent le proble`me lie´ aux e´carts entre les re´sultats des deux me´thodes.
L’avantage de l’approche de logique floue est que cette nouvelle me´thode peut s’appliquer
(est en conformite´) avec les deux normes. De plus, l’utilisation d’avis d’experts en tant que
vsource exclusive d’informations pour de´finir les niveaux de se´curite´ d’un syste`me de controˆle
s’ave`re d’eˆtre une me´thode trop complexe et subjective. Par conse´quent, l’extraction d’infor-
mations utiles ne´cessite une me´thodologie formelle. La me´thode de logique floue est utilise´e
dans cette e´tude et sert a` transfe´rer les informations d’experts a` un mode`le mathe´matique
qui est ensuite utilise´ pour de´finir les niveaux de se´curite´.
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ABSTRACT
Precisions of risk allocation and validation steps are essential to apply standard ISO 13849
on safety related control systems. However, failure rate data is rarely available to designers
and usually not provided with components used in safety systems. Recently, companies have
started to perform measurements for failure rates in order to include them into their data
sheets. Meanwhile, other data sources may be used which encompass uncertainty and error
due to dissimilar specifications between test and implementation environment. Conventional
methods used in standards based on crisp levels are not appropriate in this respect. Addi-
tionally, risk assessment method employed to define required performance level (PLr) for the
safety control system uses expert’s opinion to define risk component levels. Using expert’s
opinion entails subjectivity problem and crisp values are not appropriate to express judg-
mental risk assessment. Applying fuzzy logic in the standard can solve both these problems.
Fuzzy logic has been proven to deal effectively with uncertainty and subjectivity. It can
improve the methodology and reduce overdesign possibility.
Using fuzzy set theory two major problems in using the two safety standards, ISO 13849
and IEC 62061, can be solved to some extent. First problem in using these standards is the
different approaches they use to define required and achieved safety level for safety related
control systems. ISO 13849 uses performance levels (PLs) and IEC 62061 uses safety integrity
levels (SILs). Although safety levels in both parameters are based on probability of dangerous
failure per hour, methodologies used to define levels are different. Reassigning linguistic
values based on fuzzy sets, used in defining levels in risk parameters, can help to design
an allocation method which its result is more comparable to both approaches. This way,
safety level from the new fuzzy method may be used by both safety standards and ultimately
solves the problem of discrepancy between results from two methods. The advantage of fuzzy
approach is that the new method is in accordance with both standards. Additionally, the
employment of expert’s opinion, as the only source of information, in defining safety level for
a safety related control system is inherently subjective and complex. Therefore, elicitation
of useful information requires a formal methodology. Fuzzy method is used in this paper
to transfer information from experts to a mathematical model, which then is used to define
safety levels.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A major number of deaths around the world and in Canada are caused by occupational
accidents [5]. As a result, occupational safety have received much attention. Specifically,
countries in the European union have paid much attention and introduced laws and regu-
lations over industries to prevent occupational diseases and accidents. As an example, all
companies in Europe are required to apply requirements of machine directives [6]. Not only
occupational safety can decrease potential harm to human, it may also decrease dramatically
the resulting costs. Total cost of occupational accidents and injuries is estimated around 4%
of the national product [7]. In Canada, only in 2005, 1097 workers were killed and around
335000 were injured or suffered from accidents at work, which resulted to seven billions of
dollars expense for the government and companies [8]. Surprisingly, only in Quebec around
13000 of these accidents were caused by machines which make safety an inevitable require-
ment for industrial machines.
A major step in finding safety requirements for a machine is to perform risk assessment.
It has been shown that about 40% of faults related to programmable electronic systems
are because of underestimated risk assessment [9]. Consequently, if the safety level is not
adequate, further actions have to be taken. A very popular risk reduction method is using
guards to limit access to hazards. However, before doing risk reduction by using guards,
all efforts have to be made to remove the hazards by intrinsic design or application of good
engineering practice. Unfortunately, due to the engineering costs and limitations, it is not
always possible to do risk elimination by intrinsic safe design. If it is not possible to eliminate
a hazard through safe design, risk reduction process has to be continued until an acceptable
safety level is reached by using other practical approaches [10]. Functional safety defined as,
part of the machine control system which depends on the correct functioning of the safety
related control system and external risk reduction facilities [3], has been proven to be an
effective method to increase safety in industrial machines [11].
Figure 1.1 shows a safety problem deploying functional safety. A machine with a rotating
component is to be secured by means of a safety door so that whenever the door is opened, the
rotating part stops. A sensor detects status of the door. When the door is opened, meaning
that a dangerous situation is produced, sensor sends a signal to existing logic. The logic
2circuit then stops the machine by disconnecting the power to the rotating part of machine.
This can be implemented in different safety levels and by using different technologies.
Figure 1.1 Safety control system stops rotation when safety guard, protecting
rotating part of machine, is opened
To regulate safe machine design and to ensure that required safety level for a machine is met,
various standards have been introduced. In ISO 14121 [12], the hazard identification and
risk estimation procedures are described and risk evaluation for each hazard is discussed in
details. The EN ISO 12100 [13] , which now includes ISO 14121, introduces basic concepts and
principles required to design a safety system and includes principles for risk assessment and
risk reduction. The first standard on designing safety control systems for industrial machines
is EN 954-1 [14]. It includes all the basic requirements later used in other standards.
The EN 954-1 uses categories to describe integrity level of safety control function. Depending
on the results from risk assessment and the expectation from safety control, a category is
chosen for the safety function. The categories describe the structure of safety related control
system by using fault tolerance of the whole safety control function and how effectively tests
can find faults. A breakthrough by introduction of EN 954-1 was that categories were based on
control system’s performance and safety parts of control system could be used independently
from their technology. This means that electrical safety control systems may be used in
combination to other technologies such as hydraulic and mechanical.
First, dependency of functional safety on control system is verified. If there is no need to
use control system, design can be continued using other risk reduction methods. If control
is required, then an iterative design will be started by identifying the safety function and its
characteristics. Following full definition of the safety function, the required performance level
3will be determined using appropriate risk assessment method. Safety standards use different
approaches to assign required safety integrity level or performance level to a safety control
system and as shown later, this may end up to inconsistent results.
The next standard over safety control systems, EN ISO 13849-1:2006 [2], describes the re-
quired steps to design and integrate hydraulic, electronic and mechanical safety related parts
of control system and protective devices. The concept of performance levels, introduced in
this standard, can be viewed as an enhancement of categories which are known from the
older version, EN 954-1. Together with Part 2 of standard–EN ISO 13849-2:2003 [15], EN
ISO 13849-1:2006 replaces EN 954-1.
Another existing standard on machine safety control system is IEC 62061 [3]. It is aimed only
for electrical, electronic and programmable (E/E/PE) safety related part of control system
(SRCS). If the control system includes hydraulic or mechanical system, ISO 13849 has to be
used for non-electrical/electronic parts. The design methodology used in IEC 62061 covers
complex as well as simple structured system. It starts using machine’s life cycle and continues
by dividing up to down the design of E/E/PES safety system. Similar to its generic version,
IEC 61508, IEC 62061 uses safety integrity levels (SILs) to show the level of performance
and to classify safety system.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In next section, a brief review of safety standards and
their methodologies are presented. It emphasizes definition of problems studied in this thesis
and a literature review on what has been done. Section.3 then introduces the contribution
of each one of writer’s papers and Section.4 gives a brief conclusion.
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PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1 Standards over safety control systems in machine sector
Today, an important part of any safety control system is Electrical, Electronic and Pro-
grammable Electronic (E/E/PE) devices. The existing standards on safety control, namely
IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1, set rules on design, implementation and validation of safety
system to fulfill a required level of integrity. Risk level allocation constraints the minimum
required level of safety. Then safety control system has to be designed using standard’s
directives. Afterwards, the achieved integrity is verified versus required specifications and
probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFHd). Each of the two standards have its own
measures to achieve an integrity level.
In ISO 13849, risk allocation uses crisp levels to assign required level based on expert’s
opinion, which is not crisp in nature. Additionally during validation step, non crisp MTTFds
are mapped to crisp levels to be used in simplified method. The problem is that at each one
of these steps a level of estimation exists and values are rounded up toward safe side and
this may result to overdesign problem. The second problem is in having two safety standards
valid at the same time. The risk allocation, which defines requirements of a safety function
can be evaluated to different levels in ISO 13849 and IEC 62061. The following sections study
methodologies used in these two standards including the above mentioned problems.
2.1.1 Risk allocation and validation in ISO 13849
All machines in European territory have been required to follow safety directive after 1996.
For safety control systems, the safety standard EN 954-1:1996 has been used as a directive.
Using EN 954-1 continued with success for around a decade. It was rather easy to understand
and to apply. Since machines have been improved and new technologies have been used in
industry to build more and more complex systems, there was no question that standards had
to be revised.
It was in 1999 when ISO published a new standard in which probabilistic methods were used
in addition to previous qualitative measurements. Besides, new quantitative measurements
5were added to increase integrity. These measurements are based on probability of dangerous
failure per hour.
The quality of safety related control system in ISO 13849-1 is indicated by five Performance
Levels (PLs). These five levels are related to PFHd as shown in Table 2.1. These levels set
the maximum reachable level for a safety function. To ensure reaching the required level of
safety, other measurements such as resistance to CCF and systematic failure are required.
Table 2.1 Performance Levels used in 13849-1 and corresponding PFH
Performance Level
(PL)
Average probability of a dangerous
failure per hour (PFH) in h−1
a 1× 10−5 ≤ x < 1× 10−4
b 3× 10−6 ≤ x < 1× 10−5
c 1× 10−6 ≤ x < 3× 10−6
d 1× 10−7 ≤ x < 1× 10−6
e 1× 10−8 ≤ x < 1× 10−7
‘x’ shows resulted PFH
Using probabilistic methods causes difficulties, specifically in small companies. Using these
measurements means that required specifications of design have to be defined based on these
values and afterwards design has to be verified against them. In order to make analysis easier,
13849-1 introduced five design structures, each related to one PL. Designated architectures
suggested in ISO 13849 are depicted in Figure 2.1. If one of these architectures is used,
performance level and consequently probability of dangerous failure per hour may be calcu-
lated using the simplified proposed methodology. Otherwise, other modeling approaches such
as Markov shall be used which requires complex calculations and consequently more effort.
Figure 2.2 shows proposed design process step by step.
6(a) Designated architecture in ISO 13849-
1, Category B
(b) Designated architecture in ISO 13849-
1, Category 1
(c) Designated architecture in ISO 13849-
1, Category 2
(d) Designated architecture in ISO 13849-
1, Category 3
(e) Designated architecture in ISO 13849-1, Cate-
gory 4
Figure 2.1 Designated architectures in ISO 13849-1
7Figure 2.2 Design process used in ISO 13849-1 [1]
Based on risk allocation done on the machine, a performance level is required (PLr) and
consequently a category is chosen appropriate for that PLr. Each category is assigned to
one designated structure. These structures only show logical relation and do not represent
detailed design. It is evident that to design a safety function, one has to be skillful and
experienced to follow steps in ISO 13849-1:
1. Identification of safety functions (SF): At this step, we already know what dangerous
phenomena exist in the machine. Thus, we have to define safety functions that, if
implemented properly, can secure existing dangerous phenomena and reduce risks to
an acceptable level. For example, to secure a press which is fed manually, we may
secure backside by interlocking guard and front side by a light curtain.
2. Specification of characteristics of each SF: At this step, all requirements of each SF
have to be defined in detail. For example, for the interlocking guard, the guard is
supposed to be locked whenever machine is running. If door is opened in the running
mode, machine has to be stopped immediately and not started until it is checked and
restarted manually.
3. Determination of required PL (PLr): The required PL can be determined based on
severity of accident, exposure frequency and probability of avoidance from risk (see
8Figure 2.3).
4. Realization of SF, identification of SRP/CS: Now that PLr is determined, the SF can
be implemented based on its specification and required measurements to satisfy PLr. At
this stage, an appropriate design structure based on PLr is chosen and then components
are chosen and implemented such that they fulfill all measurements such as DCavg, etc.
This is where using simplified method can be helpful.
5. Evaluation: The designed safety function should be verified using measurements versus
performance level. If the measured performance level is smaller than PLr then design
has to be changed using one or more of the following options:
– Using redundant components
– Using diagnostic coverage to improve dangerous undetected failure rate
– Using a higher performance component to improve failure rate
It is required that a performance level be specified as the target value for each safety function.
This requirement is derived from the risk reduction that is necessary to reach target safety
level. Among values and aspects which are considered to determine the required performance
level, likelihood and severity of accident are important measures. ISO 13849 uses risk graph
to determine required performance level.
Graphical risk allocation (risk graph - Figure 2.3) is a method to calculate the required
performance level using risk parameters. The following risk parameters are required to be
evaluated as part of risk graph PL determination:
– S: Severity of injury
– F: Frequency and time of exposure to hazard
– P: Possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting the harm
The graphical safety level allocation must be performed for each safety function without
considering other risk reduction approaches. In general, the severity of injury at hazardous
zone varies widely, however, for control system’s requirements using ISO 13849 only two levels
are relevant:
– S1: Slight (normally reversible injury)
– S2: Serious (normally irreversible injury)
The frequency of exposure to hazard are evaluated to have:
– F1: Seldom-to-less-often and/or exposure time is short
– F2: Frequent-to-continuous and/or exposure time is long
It has to be noted that a clear boundary does not exist between F1 and F2. Based on an
instruction in the standard, in cases where operator intervenes more than once per hour, F2
9is more appropriate than F1. However, for a case where machine is setup once per year and
then operates automatically, the choice of F is not clear enough [1].
The possibility of avoiding the hazard P, is determined to be:
– P1: possible under specific conditions
– P2: scarcely possible
To define this parameter, physical characteristics of the machine and possible reaction of the
its operator shall be determined. As an example, if the machine has the characteristic which
forces speed limit during its operation, then P1 is more appropriate for slow speeds than P2.
The reason is that lower speed gives more room to the operator to move out of the hazardous
area. On the contrary, P2 is the right choice when high acceleration does not give enough
opportunity to the operator to evade an accident.
Figure 2.3 Graph method to estimate the required performance level (PLr) [2]
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(a) Safety door. Example taken from
BGIA report on ISO 13849-1 [1]
(b) Reliability circuit
Figure 2.4 Safety function with PL=b based on ISO 13849 for the example in Figure 1.1
Risk Parameters:
S: Severity of injury
S1: Slight (normally reversible injury)
S2: Serious (normally irreversible injury)
F: Frequency and/or exposure to hazard
F1: Seldom-to-less-often and/or exposure time is short
F2: Frequent-to-continuous and/or exposure time is long
P: Possibility of avoiding hazard or limiting harm
P1: Possible under specific conditions
P2: Scarcely possible
Figure 2.4a shows an example for a safety door designed at category 1 based on ISO 13849 and
figure 2.5 illustrates associated PL allocation. The safety function is a stop function, initiated
by a protective device. When the movable part (here door) opens, a stop function will be
initiated causing movable part of the machine to stop. A switch (B1) detects opening of the
movable guard and then contactor Q1 will disconnect power to the motor. This prevents
movement of hazardous part of machine.
First a required performance level has to be allocated to this safety function. The first
11
risk parameter to be determined is the severity of injury (S). S is equal to S1 for slight
injuries (normally reversible). Using this definition, a broken finger or broken hand should
be assigned to S1, while this can also be assigned to bruising or even small cuts. Boundaries
between levels used in graphical risk allocation are not clear. Using adverbs such as normally,
frequently, seldom and etc. makes these boundaries more vague. Can we associate a broken
rib or hand to S2? What does normally (ir)reversible mean? Wouldn’t it more proper for an
expert to have a scale between these two values, so that s(he) could assign a value between
S1 and S2 to such injury?
The next risk factor is frequency and/or exposure to hazard (F). Supposing that the frequency
of exposure to hazard more than twice per hour, F should be equal to F2. However, not
all situations are this obvious. For values between once per hour and once per year, clear
definition does not exist. Expert can interpret adverbs such as frequent or seldom to the
extent he/she has experienced. The last risk parameter is easier to be determined. The
possibility of avoiding or limiting harm can be determined as P1 for possible situations and
equal to P2 for scarcely possible situations. However, using scarcely can again be interpreted
by the expert.
Most risk evaluation (safety integrity allocation) methods are based on the same concept
of using severity and occurrence with different level of precision in defining description of
risk parameters. While various approaches exists, all suffer from the fact that using expert’s
opinion is imprecise, uncertain and prone to error (Sandri [16] and Hietikko [4]). Most
importantly, in graphical risk allocation of ISO 13849, expert has to choose between two
levels while descriptions for such levels are not always precise and helpful. As such, expert
may interpret description based on his/her experience. What if expert doubts which risk
level is applicable? What if situation does not match any of the descriptions?
In choosing a level for risk parameter, there are situations where none/both descriptions
match the situation. In such cases, expert has to choose higher risk level to keep the safe
side of design. It is not clear how frequently and continuous should be interpreted. In such
cases, expert has to choose the higher risk level and this may result to over-design. Thus, it
is appropriate to minimize such limitations in order to achieve more precise risk assessment.
Thus, the following technical issues in using ISO 13849 exist:
– Expert opinion is used to estimate discrete risk paramter levels which is not appropriate.
– Performance levels are discretized version of PFHd values, while MTTFd and DCavg are
not discrete. Consequently, validation of designed safety function requires comparison of
discrete values versus continous values.
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The paper (see Appendix A) suggests using Fuzzy to solve this problem. First reason is
that fuzzy can be used to interpret linguistic values such as: scarcely, frequent, etc. It has
also been shown that presentation of opinion using values in a range is more appropriate for
experts (see Sandri[16]). Another advantage of using fuzzy is that fuzzy risk allocation can
generate results as PFH, which can be used directly in validation step to further decrease the
chance of over/under design.
Figure 2.5 Allocation of PL to safety function in the example
After designing a SF, result has to be validated to confirm that it fulfills the required per-
formance level (PLr). This will be done by considering category, required MTTF, average
diagnostic coverage and common cause failure and using the method in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6 Simplified validation: relationship between Categories, DCavg, MTTFd of each
channel and PL
A very important task in using safety standards, is to find reliability data for safety compo-
nents to calculate MTTFd. Existing sources are: manufacturer’s data-sheet, military data
book, life-testing program in company, data in standards or other publications that include
components failure data, such as MIL-HDBK-217F, IEC/TR 62380, NPRD 95 or IEC 61709.
It is not questionable that the preference is to use manufacturer data. Since in some sectors,
it takes time to provide such data, some components do not yet have these information from
their manufacturers. Examples are hydraulic components. But, there is an increasing trend
to provide reliability data. Other sources of data that may be used are data collections from
other sectors than machinery. At the end, the standard has a table that may be used in case
that none of the above sources of information does not exist.
Diagnostic coverage also plays an important role in defining the performance level of a safety
control system. If a high value of performance level is required, tests are used to reveal any
existing problem in the system. In the case of problem, system may go to safe stop state or
continue its job depending on the system, while the failed component is flagged for repair. To
determine DCavg, first diagnostic coverage for each block has to be estimated. For simplicity,
standard has provided a table with most testing measures which are used in machinery. Next
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step is to calculate DCavg from the formula using DC and MTTFd for all blocks.
Unfortunately, the simplified method to determine attained PL employs crisp levels (see
Figure 2.6). This may give false results for small errors, specially for values close to adjacent
levels. Fuzzy can improve the result in using simplified method because instead of jumping
between performance levels for small changes in MTTF values, changes will be smooth and
instead of PLs, PFHd can be used directly. When decision has to be made between two PLs,
crisp values can give higher or lower PL than required because of a small error in MTTF
or DC. In such situations, the error in over-under design is difference between two levels.
Suppose that in Figure 2.5, expert chooses P2 and consequently PLc is resulted. In this case
we have:
Error = PLc − PLb = (10−6, 3 ∗ 10−6)− (3 ∗ 10−6, 10−5)
However, if all measurements are based on PFH, then instead of dealing with PLs, all we
have is a PFH value. As such, even if an error exists, it is based on PFH which is in worst
case equal to one performance level. Suppose that if we could estimate actual PFHd for
this safety function by another method and it was equal to 3.5 ∗ 10−6. Then suppose that
miscalculation gives a PFHd of 2.5 ∗ 10−6. In this case, the error would be equal to:
Error = 3.5 ∗ 10−6 − 2.5 ∗ 10−6 = 10−6
Although errors in MTTF and DC can still cause the result to diverge from the real value,
but this error is not as big as a performance level.
The idea is that instead of using PL, only PFH is used for allocation and validation of
performance level. The result of fuzzy risk allocation is a value based on PFH while fuzzy
can additionally improve how expert presents his opinion. Then result of simplified method,
in PFH, is compared with risk allocation to measure the difference. If allocated probability of
failure per hour is bigger than validated PFH, then safety function can be accepted, otherwise,
design has to be improved.
It has been shown that fuzzy can deal with imprecision and vagueness [17] in data and also
solve the problems in using crisp values [18]. We will use fuzzy logic to model the method
used in ISO 13849 and compare its results to conventional methodology. Since fuzzy uses
lingual values as input, it is more appropriate for use in industry.
To summarize, using fuzzy in ISO 13849 can improve:
– Risk parameter estimation: It has been shown that using intervals are more appropriate
to estimate risk parameters. Fuzzy enables experts to choose a value in an interval while
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using definitions from standard, can help and also solve problem of inconsistency between
the results.
– Graphical PL allocation: Since linguistic descriptions are used in graphical PL allocation,
risk levels are vague and can be interpreted by expert, which in turn makes them subjective
in nature.
– Graphical PL allocation: Crisp levels are used to illustrate risk parameter levels, which can
result to over/under estimation of PL for errors in defining risk parameters. Using fuzzy,
PL allocation can be expressed as PFH values, which minimizes the error due to error in
risk parameter estimation.
– Validation step: using crisp values for MTTFd and DCavg values in validation step can
similarly cause high over/under estimation error because of small variations in such values.
Using fuzzy, all values are continuous and there is no need to discretize continuous values
and increase error.
2.1.2 Risk allocation method in IEC 62061 and its comparison to graphical
method
As a machine sector standard based on IEC 61508, IEC 62061 includes rules and regula-
tions on electronic, electrical and programmable electronic control systems (E/E/PE CS)
contributing in machine safety system. The safety integrity requirements for each safety re-
lated control function (SRCF) have to be derived from risk assessment applied on each safety
related electrical part of control system (SRECS) to ensure the necessary risk reduction can
be achieved. IEC 62061 uses Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) classification. The values related
to each level show failure rate per hour (Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and according dangerous Probability of Failure per
Hour (PFHD)
An informative annex in IEC 62061 provides a qualitative approach to do risk estimation and
SIL assignment which can be used for an SRCF. Since this is informative, other approaches
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may be used based on SIL assignment approach in IEC 61508-5. Risk estimation is done by
estimating the following risk parameters for each hazard:
– Severity of harm Se
– Probability of occurrence of that harm as a function of the following items:
– Frequency and duration of the exposure of persons to the hazard Fr
– Probability of occurrence of a hazardous event Pr
– Possibility to avoid or limit the harm Av
Severity of injury (Se) or damage to health is classified to have four levels:
1: is used to indicate a minor injury such as scratches and minor bruises that require attention
by first aid
2: is used for reversible injuries, including severe lacerations, stabbing, and severe bruises
that require attention from a medical practitioner
3: is used for major irreversible injury in such a way that it can be possible to continue the
same work after healing
4: used for significant irreversible injury or death
Then each of other three parameters are estimated independently of each other. It is suggested
that worst case scenario should be applied to avoid underestimation of any risk parameter.
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(a) Frequency and duration of exposure
(b) Probability of occurrence of a hazardous event
(c) Probability of avoiding or limiting harm
Figure 2.8 Parameters of probability of occurrence of harm
To define the level of exposure, the following aspects should be considered very carefully:
– Is there any need to access to the danger zone? On which modes of operation? (normal
operation/maintenance/etc.)
– How many hours a day/week/month is the machine active and in use?
– What is the nature of access?
After determination of these aspects, an average interval between exposures is estimated.
Additionally, the duration of exposure should be estimated based on these factors.
Another factor that should be determined is the probability of harm, which is estimated inde-
pendently of the other factors. This parameter is estimated by considering the predictability
of the behavior of components related to the hazard, and characteristics of human behavior
who interacts with hazardous part. The standard suggests that “very high” has to be taken
for normal operation and choosing any lower value requires specific reasons.
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And the last parameter, probability of avoiding harm, is determined by taking into account
speed of appearance of the hazardous event, spatial possibility to withdraw from the haz-
ard, the nature of component or system (electrical hazard, sharpness, temperature, etc) and
possibility of recognition of a hazard.
Comparing to graphical method in ISO 13849, using more precise definition for each level
assures that expert can choose a more appropriate level for each risk parameter. These
parameters are then used to find Cl from the following formula:
Cl = Fr + Pr + Av
Using the matrix SIL allocation in Figure 2.9 then a safety integrity level can be allocated
to the safety function.
Figure 2.9 Matrix method to estimate the safety integrity level (SIL) [3]
Although SIL assignment seems more promising than PL assignment, it has still limitations.
Expert’s opinion is the key source of information. Additionally, IEC 62061 is only valid for
electrical and electronic safety functions and for other types of systems ISO 13849 has to
be used. This requires that results from risk assessment in ISO 13849 and IEC 62061 be in
accordance with each other. However, studies show that discrepancies exist in their results.
IEC 62061 mentions that in many machine specific standards, known as type C standard in
CEN, risk estimation is carried out to find Category based on ISO 13849-1:1999 for safety
related control functions. As such, for simplification, the relationship in Figure 2.10 between
SIL and PL is suggested. Based on this relationship,PL b and c correspond to SIL 1, PL d
correspond to SIL 2 and PL e corresponds to SIL 3. It also mentions that a better relation
is under study. Is the relationship given in Figure 2.10 always valid?
19
Figure 2.10 Safety Integrity Levels and their related Performance Level values (taken from
[1])
Martiko et al. [4] have shown that results from risk level allocation using methods in the two
standards may be different. They divided safety engineers into three groups and asked them
to do risk assessment on a machine using safety definition and design methods of ISO 13849
and IEC 62061. The following interesting points are important to be mentioned:
– Safey level allocation done by different individuals may have different results.
– Results from risk allocation based on ISO 13849 (PL) may be different from the ones based
on IEC 62061 (SIL).
– Results are mostly deviated toward the safe side.
Figure 2.11 shows results of this case study. As it can be seen, results from SIL assignment do
not match with the ones from PL in all cases. To see this, we assign SIL to a safety function.
Suppose that the severity of the accident caused by the hazard is not high, but may result
to an injury, such that based on Figure 2.9, it is equal to level 2. Looking at the figure, we
can see that with this severity level, SIL can be equal to one or two. Based on probability of
dangerous failure per hour (look at Figure 2.10), SIL 2 is equal to PL d. However, if we look
at performance level from ISO 13849, Figure 2.3, we can see that with low severity which is
equal to S1, the performance level can not go higher than level c, which is equal to SIL 1.
Thus, with the same severity level, one can conclude that the machine is at SIL=2 or SIL=1
(PL=c).
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Figure 2.11 Case study done by Martiko et al. [4]; they have grouped engineers in different
groups to study how they do risk allocation based on methods ISO13849 and IEC62061
Another way to show that results between PL and SIL can be different is shown in Figure
2.12. As an example in allocating SIL if severity is equal to three, for different values of
Cl, SIL varies from below one to three which are equal ro PL=b to PL=e. According to
relationship between SIL and PL, SIL=1 is equal to PL=b or c and SIL =3 is equal to PL e.
However, based on definitions given for severity in ISO 13849 and IEC 62061, severity of 3
in SIL allocation can be related to S2 in PL allocation. This means that for severity level of
S2 in graphical risk assessment PL can vary from PL=c to e and consequently results from
two risk allocation do not match.
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Figure 2.12 The relationship between PL and SIL. From right: PL allocation, from left: SIL
estimation.
One way to solve this problem, is to use fuzzy and possibility theory. By using possibility
theory, not only expert can present his opinion on a risk as a value between two risk levels
in ISO 13849, (s)he is able to present it as a function. This way he can indicate which values
of risk parameter are more probable.
This method can solve two problems related to risk allocation in safety standards to some
extent. One problem is the inconsistency between the allocation results. It can be solved by
presenting fuzzy values instead of crisp levels, which represent membership degree to each
risk level. For example, in graphical risk allocation in ISO 13849, severity can have a fuzzy
value between S1 and S2 which represent degree of membership to each of these two levels.
As such, if severity in Matrix risk allocation of IEC 62061 is equal to 3, a fuzzy value in that
range can be allocated to severity in graphical allocation (see Figure 2.13). To make results
more consistent, risk level definitions from IEC 62061 can be used such that, instead of
reversible and irreversible, four levels from matrix allocation are used.
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Figure 2.13 Using fuzzy to solve inconsistency between Severity parameter
Another problem with risk allocation is using expert’s opinion. Using expert opinion is always
prone to error. It has been shown that using possibility theory can improve the results by
improving the subjectivity that exist in human opinion.
The objective of second paper is to propose a new methodology based on possibility theory
to improve risk allocation methods already in use in safety standards, ISO 13849 and IEC
62061, such that their result match and it solves the problem of inconsistency between their
results. Improving risk allocation and verification in ISO 13849 based on risk factor definition
in IEC 62061, not only improves pulling opinion from experts, it also minimizes discrepancy
between risk allocation and safety level verification of the two standards.
2.2 Literature review
Introduction of standards on safety related control systems that use probabilistic methods
was a breakthrough in improving safety control systems. Since then, people have tried to
introduce these standards and improve the way they are used in industry [19, 20, 21]. Not only
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such studies have made a brighter view for designers to use standards, some also highlighted
interesting practical and theoretical problems that exist in using standards. Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (IFA) in Germany, has published a report on using ISO
13849 to design safety control systems [1]. This report can be viewed as a reference in
using ISO 13849. It has detailed explanation of each step to be followed, and at the end
it provides various design examples already done at IFA. Another example for using ISO
13849 is provided in [20] and each step is described in detail. Confusion in using standards
is discussed in [22]. It highlights the overlap between the two standards and then differences
by considering safety levels. It explains similarities and differences in scope and level of
complexity. Fukuda et al. [23] have shown that the simplified method to find performance
level in ISO 13849 does not always give the same result as reliability analysis methods such
as FTA [23]. Five circuits within different categories have been studied and results from fault
tree analysis (FTA) and ISO 13849-1 are compared.
A fundamental step in applying a safety standard is doing risk level allocation. IFA has
produced a computer-based tool to help users to find performance level [24]. Gauthier et. al.
[25] compared risk assessment methods used in standard on safety related control systems;
they used ISO/FDIS 14121-1 [12] as a benchmark. They showed that a level of variability
in using safety assessment methods of these two standards exist. Their study showed that
although risk assessment methods used in safety standards are fundamentally the same, but
they exhibit significant differences which can make confusion for users. This is also highlighted
in an article by Hietikko et al. [4]. They used risk assessment results from three case studies
in machine safety and compared them with an expected risk assessment done by an expert.
Their studies showed that people have difficulty in choosing right risk factors.
Risk allocation methods require evaluation from skilled experts. Experts are asked to evalu-
ate risk parameters using descriptions provided for each risk factor. Using expert judgment
is an essential source of information especially when no objective data is available. Since
the nature of human judgment is inherently subjective and complex, elicitation of useful
information requires a formal methodology. It was not until Cook and Goosens [26], who
introduced a comprehensive and systematic methodology for treating expert judgment, that
various methods have been proposed to pool, assess and combine experts’ opinion. These
methods are divided into two major groups: behavioral and mathematical approaches. Math-
ematical methods have shown better results than behavioral approaches [27]. Transferable
belief model (TBM), based on Dempster-Schafer theory of evidence [28], has been employed
in various fields such as: to find probability distribution in reliability [29], and in environmen-
tal studies [30]. TBM is a heuristic to model and evaluate objective and subjective evidence
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to support a hypothesis. However, due to some restrictions of Dempster-Shafer theorem,
this method may show limitations in safety analysis [31]. Probabilistic methods are also
used to estimate reliability data [32], and do risk assessment [26]. Bayesian probabilistic
approaches are broadly used in data-fusion. Despite interesting results they have shown in
elicitation of human judgment, they require multiple sources of data, and are useful when
used in human-sensor data fusion approaches.
Fuzzy systems have recently been used to deal with imprecision and uncertainty in reliability
and safety analysis [33, 34, 35]. Nait-Said et. al. [36] proposed a fuzzy rule-based approach
to improve conventional risk graph method used in IEC 61508. They showed how linguistic
values in fuzzy can improve graphical risk assessment. They also provided a calibration
method to design fuzzy scales. Sandri and Dubois [16] showed how fuzzy can be used to
better educe expert opinion. They used possibility theory to deal with imprecision in expert
judgment. Although possibility theory has been used in risk allocation method, it has never
been used to address inconsistency problem that exist between two standards.
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CHAPTER 3
CONTRIBUTION OF EACH PAPER
3.1 An Improvement in Applying Safety Standard “ISO 13849” Using Fuzzy
Logic, SIAS 2012
Allocating PFHd to safety function instead of performance levels, which are crisp values, can
further be used in validation step to decrease the probability of over/under design. Conven-
tional method in ISO 13849 requires transferring MTTFd and DCavg values to crisp levels in
order to find attained PL. In transferring non-crisp values to crisp levels, ISO 13849 rounds
values toward the safe side which increases the probability of over-design. However, this
paper suggests to use fuzzy risk allocation and validation which use PFH directly without
transferring results to PLs that is required by conventional method.
Using fuzzy logic toolbox in Matlab, risk allocation method in ISO13849 is implemented. The
risk allocation method in ISO 13849 uses risk parameters which have two levels. Therefore,
only two linguistic membership values are used for each risk parameter. By using fuzzy set
theory, experts can allocate values to risk parameters between zero and one to show risk
estimation between low and high. To avoid unnecessary complexity, it is tried to use a simple
model. Thus, semi-triangle functions are used for each membership function.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how membership values are determined based on fuzzy risk parameters.
Since membership functions are chosen to be linear, this makes the fuzzy system easier
to apply and understand. Expert opinion, presented as a value between zero and one, is
translated into two membership values for each risk parameter. He is able to choose values
for risk parameters (severity, frequency and possibility) between zero and one, which is not
possible in crisp allocation.
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Figure 3.1 An example of choosing fuzzy risk parameter; choosing severity value of 0.76 means
membership value of 0.76 for high severity and membership of 0.24 to low severity
As fuzzy inference system is applied, information flows through each step in the fuzzy system.
The fuzzification-inference-defuzzification process generates a defuzzified output from an ex-
pert opinion. For any combination of risk parameters, the output shows required safety level
as PFH. The result could be evaluated as PL by using max function for output membership
functions, before defuzzification is performed.
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Figure 3.2 Matlab implementation of fuzzy risk allocation
Subsequent to design of a safety control system, achieved performance level (PL) has to
be measured against MTTFd and DCavg. These two measurements define the maximum
claimable PL. The quality of analyses employed to validate an SRCS in ISO 13848 and
IEC 62061 is extremely important to assure reaching required safety. Such analyses are
based on crisp levels where (PL), (MTTFd) and (DCavg) are calculated and defined with
sharp boundaries. The variability of the failure rates to define MTTFd and DCavg and also
assumptions used in the standard for analytical models are based on uncertain and subjective
nature of information applied.
At the evaluation step, the result is interesting. Table [4] in the paper shows the result of
crisp evaluation against fuzzy evaluation technique. For values near transition points in Table
1 and 2, conventional approach is very sensitive to changes. The difference between 89.9%
and 90.1% can result to a change in PL regardless of MTTFd value. This is due to the fact
that transitions are crisp, and no difference is given to MTTFd and DCavg unless there is a
change in their level.
3.2 Fuzzy Performance Level Allocation in Machine Safety Standards
Using fuzzy set theory two major problems in using the two safety standards, ISO 13849
and IEC 62061, can be solved to some extent. First problem in using these standards is
different approaches they use to define required and achieved safety level for safety related
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control systems and second problem is presenting vagueness that exist in human opinion.
ISO 13849 uses performance levels (PLs) and IEC 62061 uses safety integrity levels (SILs).
Although safety levels in both parameters are based on probability of dangerous failure per
hour, methodologies used to define levels are different.
They differ in many aspects such as: deploying different number of risk parameters, levels
in each risk parameter, definition of such levels, etc. However, relationship between PL
allocation in ISO 13849 and SIL assignment in IEC 62061 suggests that required SIL and PL
for a safety function have to be equal with respect to PFH, regardless of which safety standard
is used. In other words, using table provided in both standards to transfer results between PL
and SIL should give the same result as using PL and SIL allocation independently. However,
it can be shown that in practice, relationship in Table 1 does not hold for some cases. The
following points can be mentioned as reasons:
1) Number of risk parameters are different
First difference between safety allocation methods is in number of risk parameters used in
each standard. The matrix SIL assignment method uses four risk parameters while graphical
PL allocation uses three risk parameters. In fact, probability of occurrence is not considered
in PL allocation method. Thus, it can be said that PL allocation method does not distinct
between probable and rare situations. According to IEC 62061, influential parameters to
estimate the probability of occurrence of hazard are machines conduct in different modes of
operation and human interaction with the machine.
2) Number of levels for each parameter
Another difference between two methods is in number of levels determined for each risk
parameter. Risk parameters in ISO 13849 have two levels, while in IEC 62061, 3 to 5 levels
are used for each risk parameter. Increasing levels for parameter enables experts to associate
detailed description to a hazard, however, it also increases the complexity.
Reassigning linguistic values based on fuzzy sets used in defining levels in risk parameters, can
help to design an allocation method which its result is more comparable to both approaches.
This way, safety level from new fuzzy method may be used by both safety standards and
ultimately solves the problem of discrepancy between results from two methods. Advantage
of fuzzy approach is that the new method is in accordance with both standards. Fuzzy
method used in this paper to transfer information from experts to a mathematical model,
which then is used to define safety levels, is a solution to solve elicitation problem.
The contribution of this paper is to propose a risk allocation method using possibility theory
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to solve two main problems in performance level allocation of safety standards ISO 13849
and IEC 62061:
– The subjectivity of using expert opinion to define risk parameters
– The inconsistency of risk allocation levels between methods in safety standards ISO 13849
and IEC 62061
Figure 3.3 Using possibility theory to evaluate risk parameter
Another problem with conventional PL allocation is using vague expert’s opinion. Possibility
theory can deal effectively with such problem by using linguistic values and fuzzy ranking
functions. Instead of transferring thought to single level, expert is capable to present his idea
as a function, representing his vague opinion (see Figure 3.3). Three functions that may be
used are: rectangle, triangle and trapezoid. Rectangle is used when expert wants to assign
risk parameters to an interval, meaning that possibility of risk parameters to exist in this
interval are the same. While using triangle, possibility of one point is more than others and
end points of the triangle define interval that there is any possibility. By using trapezoid,
expert first defines an interval which shows values that are possible (lower lateral) and then
s(he) defines which values are most possible (upper lateral). The upper lateral is a way to
show vagueness that can not be expressed in normal fuzzy systems.
Risk parameters in ISO 13849 are represented by fuzzy functions, while membership values
of these fuzzy functions are defined based on risk parameters in IEC 62061. By using more
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precise definitions of risk parameters in IEC 62061, not only defining the fuzzy function is
more precise, but also problem of inconsistency between results would be minimized. Thus,
what expert does is to transfer his opinion on risk graphical parameters of ISO 13849, based
on risk definition of IEC 62061. Fuzzy functions are then fed into fuzzy inference system
based on risk allocation rules of ISO 13849 to find required risk level.
One issue with using fuzzy logic is to set membership and de-fuzzification functions. Mem-
bership functions used in this approach have the simplest shape, linear between two possible
end points while non-linear MFs such as sigmoidal can be considered. Defuzzification method
may be discussed among experts to choose the most appropriate PL for a safety function. A
method to set de-fuzzification function is to use neuro-fuzzy system. A set of safety functions
with known PLs can be presented to the neural network that learns the nonlinear function
and can then help to choose de-fuzzification function parameters by decreasing error between
the results.
Another point to consider is the reliability of experts. This may be solved by presenting
problems with known answers to experts and then using nonlinear functions to interpret
their opinion. A tolerance level can also be set for acceptance of opinion. If opinion passes
this level, the expert can be categorized as invalid and unreliable.
Using expert systems in critical decision making problems are more informative approaches
rather than reliable final decision making approaches. The fuzzy approach can be an infor-
mative approach to help experts in allocating PL and SIL to a safety related control system.
It can decrease the ambiguity of results form safety standards, especially when results are
not in accordance. As mentioned, the result of using possibility theory can be discussed and
help to improve choosing appropriate performance level.
31
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The intuitive concept of fuzzy logic is a way to show how real world is sensed and described
by human. Fuzzy logic is actually a way to model systems using human reasoning approach.
The result is that fuzzy can deal with ambiguities that exist in human driven measurements.
Since risk allocation requires human reasoning to be used, fuzzy can help in this respect. Both
papers try to illustrate the advantages of using fuzzy logic over conventional risk allocation
methods.
First paper studies employing fuzzy in risk allocation and validation of risk level in ISO 13849.
Using fuzzy in the risk allocation method step in both standards can improve the results.
Transferring opinion about risk parameters is not appropriate in conventional methods, thus
using a modeling method that can improve knowledge extraction from human is helpful. In
this paper, triangle function as a simple membership function is used. Paper illustrates the
performance of using fuzzy logic in risk allocation. This way, expert is able to choose values
between high and low and show degree of membership for each risk parameter. For each risk
paramter, two membership values enter fuzzy PL allocation inference system. The result of
fuzzy PL allocation can be expressed in probability of failure per hour. Thus not only using
fuzzy in risk allocation step can deal with transferring linguistic values into values, but also
it can transfer the result into PFHd. This paper also studies validation of designed control
system versus required safety level. It is shown that fuzzy can deal with errors in data by
transferring crisp levels into smooth levels. In conventional validation method, error in data
can cause PL to be changed and result big errors. However, in fuzzy validation error is a
continous nonlinear function of changes.
Using simple membership function was used for the sake of simplicity. However, other mem-
bership functions have to be studied. Another improvement is to design output fuzzy func-
tions. Output fuzzy functions are used to transfer fuzzyfied values from inference system
into PFHd. This is done by allocating a transfer function to each performance level. In this
paper, they were designed intuitively to show fuzzy advantages. Some approaches exist to
improve these functions. One way is to use neuro-fuzzy. The idea is to have various designed
safety functions already validated by other modelling approaches, and feed them into neural
network while the output is knows. So neuro-fuzzy system tries to decrease error in the
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output by changing functions.
The second paper extends the allocation method of first paper while trying to improve its
results. By using fuzzy functions and possibility theory and then adapting the risk allocation
method of ISO 13849 to IEC 62061, not only the risk allocation method is based on an
improved pooling method, it is also more comparable to results from IEC 62061. This way,
using each one of the safety standard should give the same required safety level.
To keep the analysis easy and show important aspects of using fuzzy in risk allocation and
validation, the simplest form of membership function is used. Further analysis of other
membership functions, such as sigmoidal function can reveal the power of dealing with human
perception that exists in fuzzy. In fact, human perception uses nonlinear function to learn
and perceive information from world around.
This paper does not consider elicitation of multiple experts which happens in real world. An
improvement is to use elicitation methods that exist in fuzzy theory. Additionally, experts
are considered to be at the same level of performance. Various approaches exist to consider
experts with different level of performance. This way, reliability of experts can be studied
further.
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